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In the 1980s and 1990s, most Western European countries broke the
trend of increasing the size of the welfare state and the use of solidaristic
wage policies that were developed in the 1950s and continued through the
1970s. Increased and persistent unemployment and budget deﬁcits led
many countries to question the size of the welfare state and egalitarian
wage policies. Also, Scandinavian countries—most notably Sweden—
were forced to reassess their welfare policies, and centralized wage negoti-
ations were abandoned. Norway went in a diﬀerent direction and resisted
the trend observed in other developed countries in this period. In the early
1980s, wages were negotiated at the industry level, but in 1986 to 1987, bar-
gaining was further centralized to the national level. In the early 1990s, the
so-called solidarity alternative wage policy was introduced. This strength-
ened the guarantied negotiated minimum wage for the lowest paid (Waller-
stein, Golden, and Lange 1997; Kahn 1998; Freeman 1997). It is notable
that the earnings distribution did not increase as in most other countries
but stayed compressed until the mid-1990s (Aaberge et al. 2000).1 The re-
turn to education in Norway is fairly low and stable. Ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates from Mincer regressions suggest that the marginal return
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1. See Kahn (1998) and Hægeland, Klette, and Salvanes (1999) for explanations for the in-
creased wage compression.Because of high wage compression and strong labor market institutions,
the Norwegian economy diﬀers from most other Western economies.
However, we do not know much about the precise workings of the labor
market in Norway. To what extent do diﬀerent ﬁrms follow diﬀerent wage
policies? Do such diﬀerences relate to how workers move between ﬁrms?
What are the eﬀects of diﬀerent wage bargaining regimes? The empirical
branch of personnel economics has long been hampered by a lack of rep-
resentative data sets. Norway is one of a handful of countries that has pro-
duced rich linked employer–employee data suitable for such analysis.2 A
special feature of our data is detailed information on occupational hierar-
chies and very detailed information on wage compensation for normal
hours and overtime as well as bonuses. There is also very good informa-
tion on hours worked. We match these data to the main register-based 
employer-employee data set, containing detailed information on ﬁrm and
worker characteristics.3
Our chapter is very descriptive in nature, and it should be read as a de-
tailed country study together with the other country studies in this volume.
The chapter has three parts. First, we describe the wage setting and em-
ployment protection institutions in Norway. Next, we describe the Norwe-
gian data sets. Finally, we document a large number of stylized facts re-
garding wage structure and labor mobility within and between Norwegian
ﬁrms. We cover the period from 1980 to 1997. One topic analyzed is within-
and between-ﬁrm wage dispersion and whether wage dispersion has been
stable over time. Although overall wage dispersion has been stable, there
might still have been changes in the individual components of the variance
both across ﬁrms and across worker groups. There might also have been in-
creased sorting of workers across ﬁrms. We document these types of pat-
terns and also those of worker mobility for diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms and
workers. A unique feature of our data is that we can compare mobility
across occupations within ﬁrms for white-collar workers as opposed to the
more standard mobility patterns across ﬁrms. Another feature is the ability
to compare wage and worker mobility for white- and blue-collar workers
separately. The wage setting institutions are very diﬀerent for white- and
blue-collar workers. There is no centrally bargained wage for white-collar
workers, whereas blue-collar workers have a two-tier system with both na-
tional (or industry) and ﬁrm-level negotiations. In this way, we have an ex-
tra institutional “experiment” within the country. Furthermore, the period
we analyze was volatile in terms of business-cycle movements. Hence, our
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2. Some work on both the job and worker turnover and wage structure has been undertaken
before, but very little has been conducted on wage mobility within and between ﬁrms. See Sal-
vanes (1997), Salvanes and Førre (2003), and Margolis and Salvanes (2001).
3. See Møen, Salvanes, and Sørensen (2004) for a description of the main employer-
employee data set used in several previous studies.data are well suited for studying the cyclical pattern of wage and worker
mobility.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 9.2, we
describe the macroeconomic conditions in the period we are analyzing. Sec-
tion 9.3 presents the institutional setting in Norway, and section 9.4 pres-
ents the data we are using. In section 9.5, we look at the wage structure and
labor mobility in detail. Section 9.6 summarizes our empirical ﬁndings.
9.2 Macroeconomic Conditions
Table 9.1 and ﬁgure 9.1 show unemployment and growth rates for Nor-
way for each of the years from 1972 to 2002. We see that the macroeco-
nomic conditions have not been stable in the period covered by our anal-
ysis, 1980 to 1997. There was a mild downturn in the early 1980s, with a
peak in the business cycle around 1985 to 1987. The unemployment rate
was then about 2 percent of the labor force. From 1988 onward, Norway
experienced its worst economic recession in the postwar period, when the
unemployment rate was about 6 percent. After 1993, growth picked up,
and 1997 was a peak year in the relatively stable period after the mid-1990s.
Given these business-cycle ﬂuctuations, we have picked 1981 and 1993 as
two low-growth years and 1986 to 1987 and 1997 as two high-growth years
in our empirical analysis.
The Norwegian government plays an important part in coordinating
wage settlements, and this had important implications for wage determi-
nation in the period analyzed. For instance, wage negotiations in 1988 were
undertaken with considerable concern about the future of the Norwegian
economy. Partly because of the oil price fall in 1986, the Norwegian krone
had been devalued by 10 percent in May 1986. The largest employer asso-
ciation, the Norwegian Employers Confederation (NAF), the predecessor
of the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO), called
a lockout that failed, largely because of disagreement among the employ-
ers. This led to reductions in work time and high increases in wages in 1986.
After the subsequent downturn in the economy, the main labor union, the
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), and NAF/NHO agreed
to a moderate wage increase in 1988. To ensure that all groups followed
suit, the Storting (the Norwegian national assembly) passed a law that
wages could not increase by more than 5 percent, in line with the outcome
of the wage settlements between the LO and NHO. A similar law was
passed in 1989. Therefore, a wage-freeze policy at 5 percent nominal in-
crease was in place in these two years.
In 1990, the income regulation laws expired, yet the LO and NHO agreed
that wage increases should still be moderate because of high unemploy-
ment and the weak competitive position of the trading sector. In 1992, the
agreement among the labor market organizations on wage restraint was
Wage Structure and Labor Mobility in Norway, 1980–97 317Table 9.1 Macroeconomic conditions: Unemployment and economic growth
Economic growth (% change in GDP)
Unemployment
Year rate 1 year 2 year 5 year
1971 5.00
1972 1.7 4.97 4.99
1973 1.5 4.32 4.64
1974 1.5 4.11 4.21
1975 2.3 5.10 4.60 4.70
1976 2.0 5.70 5.40 4.84
1977 1.0 4.18 4.94 4.68
1978 1.8 3.43 3.80 4.50
1979 2.0 4.38 3.91 4.56
1980 1.7 4.83 4.61 4.50
1981 2.0 0.96 2.90 3.56
1982 2.6 0.21 0.58 2.76
1983 3.4 3.52 1.86 2.78
1984 3.2 5.74 4.63 3.05
1985 2.6 5.07 5.40 3.10
1986 2.0 3.54 4.30 3.61
1987 2.1 2.03 2.79 3.98
1988 3.2 –0.04 1.00 3.27
1989 4.9 0.95 0.45 2.31
1990 5.2 2.06 1.51 1.71
1991 5.5 3.55 2.81 1.71
1992 5.9 3.25 3.40 1.95
1993 6.0 2.69 2.97 2.50
1994 5.4 5.12 3.91 3.33
1995 4.9 4.27 4.69 3.78
1996 4.8 5.12 4.69 4.09
1997 4.0 5.06 5.09 4.45
1998 3.2 2.60 3.83 4.43
1999 3.2 2.11 2.35 3.83
2000 3.4 2.80 2.45 3.54
2001 3.6 1.91 2.35 2.89
2002 3.9 0.95 1.43 2.07
Sources: The unemployment rate is taken from the Norwegian Labour Force Survey (AKU)
published by Statistics Norway (1974, 1978, 1984, 1997, 2003a). The economic growth num-
bers are computed based on numbers from Statistics Norway (2003b).
Notes: In the computation of economic growth, the GDP numbers are ﬁxed at 2000 prices.
The formula used is growthGDP   100(lnGDPt – lnGDPt–yr)/yr, where t   1971, . . . , 2002, and
yr ∈ (1,2,5). The years 1981 and 1993 indicate low-growth years. The years 1986 and 1997 in-
dicate high-growth years.formalized in the Solidarity Alternative. In 1994, a major revision was un-
dertaken by industry, yet wage growth was moderate, following the lead
from the metal industry. In 1996 and 1998, however, proposed agreements
in line with the Solidarity Alternative were rejected in ballots. This led to
strikes and subsequent agreements on higher wage growth.
9.3 Institutional Setting
This section describes wage setting institutions in Norway for diﬀerent
worker groups and institutions for employment protection.
9.3.1 Wage Setting
In the private sector in Norway, about half of the labor force is covered
by collective agreements (Stokke, Evju, and Frøland 2003).4 Union den-
sity, that is, the share of employees who are members of a union, is some-
what lower: 43 percent in the private sector (Stokke, Evju, and Frøland
2003). These ﬁgures were very stable in the period we analyze (Wallerstein,
Golden, and Lange 1997). Bargaining coverage is higher than union den-
sity because ﬁrms covered by a collective agreement follow the agreement
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4. See Holden and Salvanes (2005) for more details on the wage setting process.
Fig. 9.1 Unemployment rate and one-year growth rate GDPfor all employees. However, in contrast to many other European countries,
extension mechanisms imposing regulations from collective agreements
onto the nonunionized sectors are not used in Norway.
The largest employees’ association is the LO, to which about half of all
union members belong. The traditional stronghold of the LO is among
blue-collar workers in the manufacturing industry, but the LO is also
prominent in some private service sectors, and for nonprofessionals and
unskilled employees in the public sector. The LO is organized as union
branches, to a large degree covering diﬀerent industry sectors. Other em-
ployees’ associations are the Confederation of Vocational Unions (YS),
covering many of the same workers as the LO; the Confederation of Higher
Education Unions (UHO), covering teachers, nurses, the police, and so on;
and Akademikerne (The Federation of Norwegian Professional Associa-
tions), covering employees with higher education. On the employers’ side,
the NHO is the dominant association in the private sector, being the main
counterpart of the LO. The NHO has about 16,000 member companies,
employing about 490,000 employees in Norway (Stokke, Evju, and Frø-
land 2003); that is, about one-quarter of the total workforce of 2.3 million.
For employees covered by collective agreements, wage setting takes
place at two levels: national (or industry) and the ﬁrm level (wage drift).
Central negotiations concern collective agreements, wage regulations,
working hours, working conditions, pensions, medical beneﬁts, and so on.
Firm-level negotiations determine possible local adjustments and addi-
tions to the collective agreements. These negotiations are generally con-
ducted under a peace clause, preventing strikes and lockouts within the
contract period of the collective (i.e., central) agreements (Holden 1998).
Collective agreements usually last for two years. Since 1964, the main revi-
sions to the collective agreements have been undertaken every second year,
in even years (most recently in 2006). The draft agreement in a main revi-
sion is subject to a ballot among union members. Occasionally, draft agree-
ments are rejected by the members, leading to a strike and subsequent ne-
gotiations during or after the strike. There are also central negotiations in
intermediate years, but the scope for these negotiations is usually limited
to wages only. Furthermore, negotiations in intermediate years are under-
taken at the national level, without any ballot requirements, which usually
ensures a more moderate wage outcome. Broadly, we can distinguish three
types of collective agreements:
• Minimum wage agreements
• Normal wage agreements
• Agreements without wage rates
Most workers are covered by minimum wage agreements, which specify
minimum wage rates, as well as other working conditions. For these work-
ers, there are local negotiations about additions to the central agreements.
320 Arngrim Hunnes, Jarle Møen, and Kjell G. SalvanesImportantly, as the local agreements specify additions to the central agree-
ments, an increase in the centrally speciﬁed minimum wage rates raises the
wage of all workers, even if they are paid more than the minimum rates.
Workers covered by normal wage agreements are not supposed to have lo-
cal wage negotiations, so their wages and working conditions are fully
speciﬁed by the central agreements. At the opposite end, there are also
agreements without wage rates, specifying only procedures for the local
wage setting. These agreements are only used for white-collar workers.
Hence, an important feature of the Norwegian wage setting is that white-
collar wages are mainly set at the ﬁrm level and thus reﬂect conditions at
the ﬁrm level. It should also be noted that there is no national, statutory
minimum wage for all workers in Norway. Minimum wages only apply to
workers covered by collective agreements.
Although blue-collar wages are negotiated centrally, there is consider-
able variation between sectors with regard to the number of ﬁrms with lo-
cal bargaining and the importance of the wage drift—the change in wages
due to local negotiations. Figure 9.2shows the total wage change in the pe-
riod 1970 to 1996 for blue-collar workers. As can be seen from the ﬁgure,
quite a large proportion of total wage gains are realized at the local level;
see also Holden and Rødseth (1990). This means that the sector minimum
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Fig. 9.2 Total wage change in Norway decomposed by national (or industry) and
locally bargained wage in the private sector in Norway
Source: The Norwegian Technical Calculation Committee for Wage Settlements (TBU).wage will not be binding for several ﬁrms as they have locally contracted
higher wages. In our data, a relatively small proportion of the workforce is
paid at or near the minimum wage, and local bargaining could be one rea-
son why this is so.
9.3.2 Employment Protection
Rules regarding individual and collective dismissals, as well as those
about the ﬂexibility of industrial plants with respect to temporary hiring
and the use of subcontractors, are important aspects of employment pro-
tection and thus the costs of adjustment for ﬁrms.5 The diﬀerent types of
constraints regulating the hiring and ﬁring of workers are not completely
transparent because, in addition to national laws, collective agreements be-
tween employers and workers’ organizations are also very important in
regulating the adjustment of the labor factor. These agreements may diﬀer
across industries and workers, depending upon workers’ age, tenure, and
so on.
Two main laws govern the labor relations in Norway: the law on em-
ployment (Sysselsettingsloven) and the law on labor relations (Arbeids-
miljøloven). The law on employment mainly regulates changes in labor dur-
ing a period of restructuring and mass layoﬀs by the ﬁrm. The latter was
enacted in 1982, and it includes standards for general working conditions,
overtime regulations, and legal regulation for employment protection. Ac-
cording to the law on labor relations, dismissals for individual reasons are
limited to cases of disloyalty, persistent absenteeism, and so on. In general,
it is possible, but very diﬃcult, to replace an individual worker in a given
job with another worker. Hence, there is strong employment protection in
Norway. The law on employment states that the general rule for laying oﬀ
a worker for economic reasons is that it can occur only when the job is “re-
dundant” and the worker cannot be retained in another capacity. This reg-
ulation covers all workers regardless of how long they have been employed.
Requirements for collective dismissals in Norway basically follow the
common minimum standards for European Union (EU) countries. It is im-
portant to note that a ﬁrm can dismiss workers not only when it is making
a loss but also when it is performing poorly. There is no actual rule on the
selection of workers to be dismissed. However, the legal practice narrows
down which workers can be dismissed. Conversations with lawyers in the
employees’ organizations indicate that many, if not most, dismissal cases
are taken to court. This is costly for ﬁrms.
When it comes to other costs of dismissal, the employment law states
that employment is terminable with one month’s notice for workers with
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5. A new law of employment protection and the use of time-limited labor contracts has been
proposed by the government and is to be decided upon in 2005. The main proposals are to al-
low more ﬂexible use of ﬁxed-term contracts and more ﬂexible use of overtime work.tenure of less than or equal to ﬁve years. This one-month notice period is
at the lower end of the spectrum compared to many countries. However,
most workers have a three-months’-notice requirement for both parties to
the contract. Although there is no generalized legal requirement for sever-
ance pay in Norway, agreements in the private sector require lump-sum
payments to workers aged between ﬁfty and ﬁfty-ﬁve. As an example, in the
contract between the LO and NHO, a worker who is ﬁfty and has been
working for ten consecutive years in the ﬁrm, or twenty years in total, is el-
igible for one to two months’ pay. Similar agreements exist for the other
unions. Some EU-countries have even stronger job protection rules, in-
cluding, for instance, general compensation, a social plan for retraining, or
transfer to another plant within a ﬁrm. Although not mandatory, some of
these other requirements are also commonplace in Norway. Note ﬁnally
that while some costs of reducing the workforce (such as redundancy pay-
ments) are related to the size of the reduction, others (such as advance no-
tice requirements, legal, and other administrative costs) may have signiﬁ-
cant ﬁxed components.
The workforce ﬂexibility of an economy can be enhanced by allowing
ﬁxed-term contracts in addition to standard contracts, and by the use of
temporary work agencies. In many Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) countries, there has been a strong trend 
toward liberalizing the use of these two schemes. In Norway, the use of
ﬁxed-term contracts is allowed only for limited situations, such as spe-
ciﬁc projects, seasonal work, or the replacement of workers who are absent
temporarily. However, it is not as restrictive as it appears, as deﬁning a spe-
ciﬁc project for a ﬁrm is partly open to discretion. Repeated temporary
contracts are possible with some limitations, and there is no rule limiting
the accumulated duration of successive contracts. In general, the use of
temporary work agencies is prohibited, but substantial latitude exists for
service-sector occupations. Restrictions for the number of renewals exist,
and two years is the maximum for accumulated contracts. Compared to
other OECD countries, Norway is ranked a little bit above average for the
strictness of the use of temporary employment (OECD 1999). Very few
comparative studies of the overall degree of employment protection exist.
A much-cited study by Emerson (1987) ranks Italy as having the strongest
employment protection rules, while the United Kingdom and, on some cri-
teria, Denmark, are at the other end of the spectrum. Norway is ranked to-
gether with Sweden, France, and, to a lesser extent, Germany (when all
regulations are taken together) as an intermediate country with a fairly
high degree of protection. Obviously, intercountry comparisons are diﬃ-
cult. The most recent comparison was made by the OECD in 1999, where
Norway was ranked at number twelve out of nineteen OECD countries in
the late 1980s, and as number nineteen out of twenty-six OECD countries
in the late 1990s in the degree of restrictiveness (OECD 1999). Evidence on
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suggests that it is about average for OECD countries, although worker
ﬂows are a bit below average (Salvanes 1997; Salvanes and Førre 2003).
The overall impression is that legislation, contracts, and common practice
impose important additional costs in Norway when adjusting the labor
force downward, and possibly upward as well. See Nilsen, Salvanes, and
Schiantarelli (2003) for an analysis of the eﬀect of labor adjustment costs
in Norway.
9.4 Data
Like other Scandinavian countries, Norway has rich and high quality
linked employer-employee data sets. The sources and structure are basi-
cally the same as the data sets used in Denmark, Sweden, and France. The
basis of the Norwegian data is administrative ﬁles from Statistics Norway
and plant-level information from the annual census for manufacturing plus
a similar data set for private and public service sectors. Information on 
research and development (R&D) and trade statistics has been added as
well. See Møen, Salvanes, and Sørensen (2004) and Salvanes and Førre 
(2003) for a general description of the Norwegian linked employer-employee 
data sets.
In this chapter, we take advantage of two new data sets, one for white-
collar workers and one for blue-collar workers. We can match these to the
linked employer-employee data as they both use the same series of person
identiﬁers. Both these data sets are from the NHO, the main employers’ as-
sociation in Norway. The white-collar data set is the main data set used 
in this chapter. Its main advantage over data that has been available so far
is that it contains information on hourly wages, overtime hours, pay, 
and bonus pay as well as detailed information on occupations. The main
employer-employee data set contains only information on annual earnings
and education, but none about occupations.
9.4.1 White-Collar Data
The white-collar data contain employment and wage data information
from the NHO, which has about 16,000 member companies. Seventy-three
percent of these companies have fewer than twenty person-years (both
blue- and white-collar workers). The member companies employ about
450,000 workers, mainly in construction, services, and manufacturing in
Norway (NHO 2004).6 There is a bias toward manufacturing. Many of the
member companies in the NHO operate in export and import competing
industries. The total labor force in Norway is about 2.3 million workers, of
whom about half were employed in the public sector in the year 2000;
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6. Note that this data set is very similar to the Swedish data set used in Oyer (chapter 12 in
this volume) and the Finnish one used in Uusitalo and Vartiainen (chapter 5 in this volume).hence, the NHO covers roughly 40 percent of private-sector employment.
In terms of private-sector gross domestic product (GDP), the members of
the NHO produce about 40 percent.
The data is based on establishment records for all white-collar workers
employed by ﬁrms that are members of the NHO confederation. Norwe-
gian law requires all employers to report data on wages and employment
annually to Statistics Norway. Until 1997, the NHO collected data for their
member plants under this law, and Statistics Norway collected data for 
the rest of the economy. From 1997, Statistics Norway collected data from
all sectors. The data set is considered to be very precise, as the wage data
were a major source of information for the collective bargaining process 
in Norway between the NHO and the unions. See Holden and Salvanes
(2005) for an assessment of the wage data from this source as compared to
other sources of earnings data from Norwegian registers.
Our data cover an average of 97,000 white-collar workers per year in
diﬀerent industries during the period 1980 to 1997.7 The chief executive
oﬃcers (CEOs) (and in large ﬁrms, vice CEOs) are, in principle, not in-
cluded. The average number of plants is 5,000, and the average number of
ﬁrms is 2,700 per year.
As mentioned, we have merged the NHO data set with the main admin-
istrative matched employer-employee database. This database contains a
rich set of information on workers and plants for the period 1986 to 2002.
In principle, this merging allows us to identify CEOs and vice CEOs indi-
rectly. One of the reasons for merging the NHO data set with the adminis-
trative register, besides obtaining more information, is that it is unclear
whether the information reported in the NHO statistics pertains to plants,
ﬁrms, or a combination of the two.8 Compare this with section 9.4.3 for
how this problem is solved. On average, we could match 97 percent of
workers with plants and 93 percent with ﬁrms.
Main Variables
In this section, we brieﬂy describe some of the most important variables
in the white-collar worker data set.
Occupation. Each worker is assigned an occupational group and a level
withinthe occupational group. The groups are labeled A through F: Group
A is technical white-collar workers, Group B is foremen, Group C is ad-
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7. The year 1987 is missing. However, the data set for each year contains lagged values;
hence, we were able to reconstruct 1987 by using lagged values in the 1988 ﬁle. This is, of
course, not a perfect reconstruction, as we do not have information on workers who left the
data set in 1987 and were not in the 1988 ﬁle.
8. The register data covers the year 1986 and onward, and the merging between the NHO
data set and the register data is almost perfect. However, we do not have register data for the
years 1980 to 1985. In order to construct the link between workers and plants in this period,
we used various methods. Important sources of information were the job start date in the 1986
register data and the links provided in the 1980 census data.ministration, Group D is shops, and Group E is storage. Group F is a mis-
cellaneous group consisting of workers that do not ﬁt in any of the other
categories. Hierarchical level is given by a number where zero represents
the top level. The number of levels deﬁned varies by group and ranges from
1 (F) to 7 (A). Table 9.2 shows the distribution of workers on the occupa-
tional groups. These codes are made by NHO for wage bargaining pur-
poses, and as such they are similar across ﬁrms and industries. That infor-
mation is one of the unique features of this data set, and it gives us a picture
of how the hierarchical structure looks within each ﬁrm. For example, we
are able to study mobility within a ﬁrm and questions related to promotion.
We deﬁne an occupation as a combination of group and level. That gives
us twenty-two occupations.9 To create a single hierarchy within a ﬁrm, we
aggregate the twenty-two diﬀerent occupations into seven diﬀerent levels.
This gives a maximum of seven levels in a single ﬁrm.10 To help in the ag-
gregation, we have carefully utilized the NHO’s descriptions of the diﬀer-
ent occupational groups. Still, such a harmonization across occupational
groups is diﬃcult. One problem lies in the fact that some levels are over-
lapping with respect to responsibility in the organization. For example,
even though we aggregate occupational Groups A31 and A32 into the
same level (see table 9.3), we know that they diﬀer in responsibility, as A31
involves management of other workers while A32 does not (however, they
are both ranked above the A4 level). Furthermore, the levels deﬁned within
each group do not necessarily align; for example, level 1 within Group B
seems closest to level 1 within Group A, but also overlaps with level 2. Level
2 within Group B is closest to level 3 within Group A, but also overlaps
with level 2. Table 9.4 shows the distribution of workers on the seven levels.
Note that in terms of white-collar workers, the typical ﬁrm is not “pyramid
shaped.” Most workers are at the middle levels.
Wage. We use monthly salary (on September 1st) for white-collar workers
including the value of fringe beneﬁts and excluding overtime and bonuses.
Indirect costs to the ﬁrm such as payroll tax, pensions, and so on are not
included. We transform nominal wages to real wages using the Consumer
Price Index with base year 1990 (Statistics Norway 2004).
Hours. The hours reported in the data are average normal hours per week
exclusive of lunches and overtime.
Bonuses. This variable gives the monthly average value of bonuses, com-
missions, and production bonuses during the twelve months prior to Sep-
tember 1st.
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9. In the data set, we also have a much richer set of four-digit job codes. These are less con-
sistently used across ﬁrms and, perhaps, also within ﬁrms across time. We have, therefore, not
yet utilized this information.
10. Note that not all ﬁrms will have workers on each of the seven levels.Tenure. To create the tenure variable, we used the job start variable that is
present in the administrative register data.
Restrictions on the Sample
We put the following restrictions on the sample:
1. To remove outliers in the data, we imposed the restriction that the
monthly wage should be at least 2,000 NOK measured in 1980 kroner.
2. The number of hours worked per week is thirty or above; that is, we
look at full-time workers.
3. The number of full-time workers in each ﬁrm is at least twenty-ﬁve in
year t.
4. The number of full-time workers in each ﬁrm is at least twenty-ﬁve in
year t – 1.11
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Table 9.2 Distribution of workers in occupational groups
Year
Occupational group 1981 1986 1993 1997
A0 0.40 0.50 0.51 0.55
A1 2.18 2.58 3.69 4.13
A2 4.80 6.50 6.91 6.89
A31 4.44 5.22 4.34 4.64
A32 5.66 6.64 8.76 8.34
A41 1.45 1.63 1.36 1.19
A42 7.30 7.34 7.34 8.43
A5 4.83 4.80 4.08 4.61
A6 1.79 1.68 1.61 1.33
B1 0.59 0.54 0.68 0.76
B2 2.24 1.93 1.95 1.92
B3 11.96 9.16 7.27 6.35
C0 0.91 1.02 1.07 1.11
C1 5.54 5.51 6.59 6.41
C2 8.82 9.80 10.33 10.61
C3 13.34 14.09 14.60 13.89
C4 9.88 7.92 6.28 5.80
D1 0.33 0.24 0.36 0.29
D2 0.96 0.68 0.92 0.86
E1 1.44 1.20 0.93 0.79
E2 3.04 2.91 1.81 1.91
F 8.09 8.10 8.63 9.20
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
11. This restriction, agreed on by all project members present at an National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) meeting in Boston in April 2004, introduces a selection bias in
the entry and exit rates related to ﬁrms crossing the twenty-ﬁve worker threshold.Because our data set only contains white-collar workers, this means that
we are looking at large ﬁrms by Norwegian standards. In 1993, a ﬁrm with
twenty-ﬁve full-time white-collar workers had, on average, sixty blue-
collar workers. Table 9.5 shows the eﬀect of our restrictions on the number
of workers and ﬁrms.
9.4.2 Blue-Collar Data
Our blue-collar data set was obtained from Teknologibedriftenes Lands-
forening (TBL), (the Federation of Norwegian Manufacturing Indus-
tries).12The TBL is by far the largest federation within the NHO. As of De-
cember 2003, the TBL has about 1,150 member companies employing
about 66,000 workers. The member companies operate in industrial sectors
ranging from mechanical and electrical engineering to information tech-
nology, furnishing, and textile industries (TBL 2004). The data set covers
blue-collar workers only, and consists of quarterly observations for the pe-
riod 1986 to 1998; that is, a span of thirteen years.13Each quarter covers on
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12. Because these data are used only in a small part of our analysis, this description will be
somewhat briefer than our description of the white-collar data.
13. The 4th quarter of 1987 is missing.
Table 9.3 Harmonization of levels
Level Occupational groups
7 (top) A0, C0
6 A1, B1, C1
5A 2
4 A31, A32, B2, C2
3 A41, A42, B3, C3, D1, E1
2 A5, F, D2, E2
1 (bottom) A6, C4
Table 9.4 Distribution of workers in harmonized levels
Year
Level 1981 1986 1993 1997
7 (top) 1.32 1.52 1.58 1.66
6 8.31 8.62 10.95 11.30
5 4.80 6.50 6.91 6.89
4 21.16 23.59 25.38 25.50
3 35.82 33.67 31.85 30.94
2 16.92 16.49 15.44 16.58
1 (bottom) 11.67 9.61 7.89 7.13
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00average 34,000 workers. Examples of principal variables are pay (ﬁxed,
piece, and overtime) and hours worked (regular hours, piece hours, and
overtime). Each worker is classiﬁed on the basis of a three-digit code de-
scribing which working group the worker belongs to; therefore, we have in-
formation on what kind of job the worker is doing.
We have linked these data to information from administrative registers
in the same way as we have linked the white-collar data; compare with sec-
tion 9.4.1.
Merging Blue- and White-Collar Data
A logical next step is to merge the blue- and white-collar data sets to get
one sample with information about whole ﬁrms. This is possible because
the TBL is a member of the NHO. Hence, the ﬁrms in our blue-collar data
set are a subsample of the ﬁrms in our white-collar data set. Most member
ﬁrms in the TBL belong to Sector 38 (Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, machinery, and equipment). We, therefore, have constrained the
merging of blue- and white-collar data to this sector.14When combining the
data, we have adjusted for the fact that some of the information is not di-
rectly comparable. For example, the TBL data report quarterly wage while
the NHO data report monthly wage. Also, because the TBL data span 1986
to 1998 and the NHO data span 1980 to 1997, we are restricted to the pe-
riod 1986 to 1997.
After cleaning up the merged sample by removing ﬁrms with only blue-
collar or white-collar workers and putting the same restrictions on the
sample as given in section 9.4.1, we are left with a sample of 24,268 work-
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14. When talking about blue-collar workers in this chapter, we mean blue-collar workers in
Sector 38.
Table 9.5 The eﬀect (i.e., the diﬀerence between each row in the table) of
restrictions on the number of white-collar workers and ﬁrms in the sample
1981 1986 1993 1997
No. of white-collar workers
No restrictions 74,075 91,911 100,087 111,336
Outliers 74,074 91,896 99,648 110,516
Hours per week  30 73,776 91,695 94,404 104,899
Firmsize  25 in year t 60,657 78,587 80,831 87,533
Firmsize  25 in year t – 1 56,838 73,600 76,449 79,259
No. of ﬁrms
No restrictions 2,348 2,622 2,682 3,838
Outliers 2,348 2,622 2,638 3,715
Hours per week  30 2,327 2,614 2,509 3,518
Firmsize  25 in year t 532 591 586 679
Firmsize  25 in year t – 1 467 506 521 565ers in 1987; 26,805 in 1993; and 25,446 in 1997. Numbers of ﬁrms are 119,
149, and 139, respectively. This implies that we are able to link approxi-
mately 25 percent of the NHO ﬁrms with the TBL ﬁrms.15
9.4.3 Deﬁning Plant and Firm
In this subsection, we explain brieﬂy how we were able to link employees
to plants and ﬁrms—a link that is crucial. Both the white- and blue-collar
data set contain an employer identiﬁcation number, which is the employer’s
member number in the TBL (blue-collar data) or NHO (white-collar
data).16 It has not been possible to establish whether this employer identi-
ﬁcation represents a plant, a ﬁrm, or a combination of the two. It is also un-
clear how plant and ﬁrm restructuring is handled. To overcome these ob-
stacles, we take advantage of the National Employer-Employee register,
which links employers and employees for administrative purposes related
to tax and social beneﬁts.17The Employer-Employee register uses the same
person identiﬁcation number as our white- and blue-collar data sets.
Hence, we use the person identiﬁcation number as the merging variable
when adding plant and ﬁrm information from the Employer-Employee
register.18 In fact, the person identiﬁcation number is the key variable that
allows us to merge the new data sets with other ﬁrm and worker informa-
tion to which we have access.
9.5 Results
In this section, we provide detailed descriptive measures of the wage
structure and wage mobility in Norway for both blue- and white-collar
workers for the years 1981, 1986 to 1987, 1993, and 1997. These years com-
prise two peak years and two trough years in the business cycle as ex-
plained in section 9.2. The white-collar results consist of all white-collar
workers covered by the NHO and include both manufacturing and private
services. When we assess both white- and blue-collar workers working in
the same ﬁrms, we are restricted to one sector within manufacturing only:
manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery, and equipment
(Sector 38). This sector comprises about half of the labor force in the man-
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15. This number is approximate as we look at the number of ﬁrms after imposing the re-
strictions in section 9.4.1.
16. The member numbers in the TBL and NHO are not compatible.
17. To be precise, we do not use the actual numbers from the Employer-Employee register
but plant and ﬁrm numbers used by Statistics Norway and added to the Employer-Employee
register by them.
18. The original person identiﬁcation number both in the white- and blue-collar data sets
and in all national administrative registers is the individuals’ social security number. When
preparing the various data sets for research use, Statistics Norway recodes the social security
numbers in order to preserve anonymity. The link ﬁle between the original series and the re-
coded personal identiﬁcation numbers used in our data sets is maintained by Statistics Nor-
way only.ufacturing sector and both high-tech and low-tech ﬁrms as explained in
section 9.4.2. It is important to distinguish between the wage structures for
white-collar and blue-collar workers in Norway, as the institutional setting
for wage determination is quite diﬀerent in the private sector. As explained
in section 9.3.1, white-collar workers have their wages mainly set at the ﬁrm
or plant level, whereas blue-collar workers’ wages are mainly set by central
bargaining. Robustness tests will be presented where we use plant-level re-
sults instead of ﬁrm-level results. Recall also that ﬁrms included in our
analysis have more than twenty-ﬁve workers in each year. This means that
we are assessing relatively large ﬁrms by Norwegian standards.
9.5.1 Wage Structure in Norway
Wage Dispersion for Workers, 1980–1997
Figures 9.3 and 9.4 depict the development of average wage by present-
ing the average wage and the 90th, 75th, 25th, and 10th percentiles from
1981 to 1997. When we consider white-collar workers alone, we notice that
the overall real wage increase has been about 20 percent in the period.
Blue-collar workers’ wages have had a similar increase. Noticeable in both
cases is a slight increase in real wages around 1985 and then a drop in the
late 1980s due to the wage freeze at 5 percent nominal rises in 1988 and
1989. Real wages started to rise again in the 1990s. The diﬀerent portions
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Fig. 9.3 Log monthly wage for white-collar workers in the private sectorof the wage distribution basically follow the same pattern, and wage dis-
persion did not increase in this period either within the group of white-
collar workers or for all workers taken together. A rather stable wage dis-
tribution is also conﬁrmed by the estimated kernel densities presented 
in ﬁgure 9.5 and for both white- and blue-collar workers in ﬁgures 9.6,
9.7, and 9.8. The results conﬁrm previous ﬁndings (Salvanes, Burgess, and
Lane 1999; Aaberge et al. 2000) of no increase in wage dispersion in Nor-
way in this period,19and diﬀer substantially from the development in other
OECD countries and notably for other Scandinavian countries (see Skans,
Edin, and Holmlund [chapter 7 in this volume] and Oyer [chapter 12 in this
volume] for Sweden and Uusitalo and Vartianen [chapter 5 in this volume]
for Finland).
From ﬁgures 9.7 and 9.8, we see that there is more wage variance among
white-collar workers than among blue-collar workers. This is to be ex-
pected because white-collar workers include high-wage management as
well as low-end staﬀ positions. In addition, the wage of white-collar work-
ers is mainly determined locally (so-called wage drift), while the wage of
blue-collar workers is mainly determined though centralized collective
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19. There is some evidence that wage dispersion increased in the late 1980s. See Faggio, Sal-
vanes, and Reenen (2007), using earnings data going beyond 1997.
Fig. 9.4 Log monthly wage for workers in the machinery and equipment industry
(Sector 38)
Note: Graphs by all workers/blue-collar workers/white-collar workers.Fig. 9.6 Kernel densities for both blue- and white-collar workers in the machinery
and equipment industry (Sector 38)
Fig. 9.5 Kernel densities for white-collar workers in the private sectorFig. 9.7 Kernel densities for workers in the machinery and equipment industry
(Sector 38)
Note: Graphs by group.
Fig. 9.8 Kernel densities for workers in the machinery and equipment industry
(Sector 38) by year
Note: Graphs by year.agreements. See section 9.3.1 for more about this. Hence, white-collar
wages are more strongly inﬂuenced by ﬁrm heterogeneity.
In table 9A.1 in the appendix, we present more detailed measures for the
structure of wage levels for white-collar workers.20 In table 9A.2 in the ap-
pendix, the same type of results are presented for white- and blue-collar
workers in the machinery and equipment industry (Sector 38). In these
tables, we also report the wage distribution by age. From the lower panel of
table 9A.1, we see that older white-collar workers (age forty-ﬁve to ﬁfty)
have a higher wage level than younger workers (age twenty-ﬁve to thirty) as
expected but also higher wage dispersion than younger workers. This im-
plies that pay for unobserved characteristics is correlated with the age of
the workers. Both groups seem to follow a similar pattern of wage increases
over time, but wage dispersion appears to be increasing for older workers.
Within- and Between-Firm Wage Dispersion
In this section, we assess the variation of wages at the ﬁrm level. Is the
modest and stable overall wage dispersion in Norway representative for all
ﬁrms, or are there large diﬀerences in wage structure across ﬁrms? From
the institutional setting, we would expect that centralized wage setting in-
duces very similar wage structures across ﬁrms, but we also know that wage
drift is important (see ﬁgure 9.2), particularly for white-collar workers. In
addition, we know that technological change, increased international
trade, and outsourcing are distributed unequally across ﬁrms. These forces
have been as important in Norway as in most other countries and may lead
to differences in wage dispersion across ﬁrms (Salvanes and Førre 2003).
Such possible diﬀerences may, of course, reﬂect diﬀerent factors such as
productivity diﬀerences, diﬀerences in wage policy, or diﬀerences in the
composition of the workforce.
Recall that the average wage increase is about 20 percent for white-collar
workers in the period we are analyzing. In ﬁgure 9.9, we present the real
wage increase at the ﬁrm level for both the mean wage level and diﬀerent
parts of the distribution. We see that the wage increase has been very sim-
ilar for diﬀerent parts of the wage distribution of ﬁrms. This implies that
there has not been any increased wage dispersion across ﬁrms over time in
Norway. More detailed results, and results for blue- and white-collar work-
ers together in the machinery and equipment industry can be found in
tables 9A.3 and 9A.4 in the appendix.
In order to further assess the wage structures within and between ﬁrms,
we decompose the wage structure. These results are presented in ﬁgure 
9.10 for white-collar workers only and in ﬁgure 9.11 for blue- and white-
collar workers in the machinery and equipment industry (Sector 38). 
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20. Table 9A.12 presents the same numbers at plant level instead of ﬁrm level.Fig. 9.9 Mean of ﬁrm mean log monthly white-collar wage in the private sector
Fig. 9.10 Decomposition of log monthly wages for white-collar workers in the
private sectorCorresponding numbers are given in tables 9A.9 and 9A.10 in the appen-
dix.21 As expected, only 15 to 20 percent of the wage variation for white-
collar workers are between ﬁrms. Thus, most of the wage dispersion in
Norway is within ﬁrms. It is important to note, however, that there was a
slight increase in the magnitude of ﬁrm wage diﬀerences at the end of the
period (see also ﬁgure 9.13). Somehow, the ﬁrms became more diﬀerent
over time. Turning to the results for both white- and blue-collar workers in
the same ﬁrms, we notice in ﬁgure 9.11 that there is a big diﬀerence between
white- and blue-collar workers and between sectors. First, the total vari-
ance is, as expected, much larger for white-collar workers within the same
sector. Second, the total variance for white-collar workers is also, as ex-
pected, lower within the machinery and equipment industry (Sector 38)
than when private services are included as in ﬁgure 9.10. Hence, because
there is less variance within the machinery and equipment industry and be-
cause blue-collar workers are in the majority here, the total variance for
both groups taken together is lower than the results shown for white-collar
workers only in ﬁgure 9.11. However, again the within-ﬁrm part dominates
the between-ﬁrm part, and there is a slight increase in the between-ﬁrm
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21. Table 9A.13 gives the numbers for white-collar workers, where we use plants instead 
of ﬁrms.
Fig. 9.11 Decomposition of log monthly wage for workers in the machinery and
equipment industry (Sector 38)
Note: Graphs by all workers/blue-collar workers/white-collar workers.part at the end of the period. One slightly puzzling result, however, is that
when we compare the between-ﬁrm part for blue- and white-collar work-
ers separately within the machinery and equipment industry (Sector 38),
the between-ﬁrm part is far bigger for blue-collar workers than for white-
collar workers (see the details in table 9A.10 in the appendix). Because
ﬁrm-level negotiations are much more important for white-collar workers
than for blue-collar workers, we would have expected the opposite. As can
be seen from ﬁgure 9.2, the wage drift part is also very important for blue-
collar workers, so this may partly explain the puzzle.
In order to test whether the increased between-ﬁrm component for
white-collar workers is due to changes in the worker composition on ob-
servables, we show the decomposition of the residual wage distribution in
ﬁgure 9.12 after controlling for type of education, gender, and age in a
Mincer wage equation estimated annually (corresponding numbers are
given in table 9A.9 in the appendix). Two important ﬁndings are evident.
We basically get the same result in the ﬁrst part of the period. Between-ﬁrm
wage dispersion accounts for about 17 percent of the total dispersion.
However, controlling for compositional changes, the increase in the wage
dispersion across ﬁrms at the end of the period completely disappears. This
is made even clearer in ﬁgure 9.13, where we report the ratio of the
between-ﬁrm and total variation. The large increase in diﬀerences in wages
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Fig. 9.12 Decomposition of residuals from Mincer equations for white-collar
workers in the private sectordue to changes in the workforce composition started in the beginning of
the large downturn of the Norwegian economy in the late 1980s. The ﬁnd-
ing of relatively strong compositional changes in Norwegian ﬁrms in this
period is also supported by other studies that assess reallocation of jobs
and workers (Salvanes and Førre 2003). Salvanes and Førre ﬁnd that the
bulk of reallocation of jobs is between ﬁrms within ﬁve-digit sectors, indi-
cating that structural change at this level has been important in explaining
the change in the composition of workers in the ﬁrms. The change has been
connected to increased technological change and increased international
trade.
It is interesting to compare our results with other Scandinavian coun-
tries that have diﬀerent wage setting institutions. Sweden started out with
centralized wage bargaining like Norway’s, but in the early 1980s it basi-
cally decentralized wage bargaining to the industry level and, unlike Nor-
way, did not recentralize. Finland has had partly decentralized wage bar-
gaining at the industry level since the early 1980s, and, as in Norway,
plant-level bargaining has been important over the whole period. When we
compare total wage dispersion and the importance of the ﬁrm level in de-
termining wages, Norway is very similar to Sweden in the 1980s, when the
wage bargaining institutions were similar. According to Skans, Edin, and
Holmlund (chapter 7 in this volume), the ﬁrm-level part constituted about
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Fig. 9.13 Fraction of total variance for white-collar workers in the private sector
explained by between-ﬁrm eﬀects20 percent until about 1990, and then it increased to about 30 percent of
wage dispersion in Sweden around the year 2000. For Norway, it increased
less, at least until 1997. A similar pattern is found when controlling for sort-
ing to explain the increased importance of ﬁrms in determining wages.
Sorting is important both in Sweden and in Norway, but in Sweden, real
ﬁrm eﬀects also exist. Finland is very diﬀerent from Norway and Sweden
in that the total wage dispersion is much smaller and constant throughout
the period. Furthermore, Finland is vastly diﬀerent when it comes to the
importance of ﬁrm eﬀects: the ﬁrm eﬀect was negligible in the beginning
and explains the entire wage dispersion from the late 1990s (Uusitalo and
Vartiainen, chapter 5 in this volume).
9.5.2 Firm Size
Davis and Haltiwanger (1996) have shown ﬁrm size to be important in
explaining wage diﬀerences. Figure 9.14 shows the average of log monthly
wage for white-collar workers distributed by ﬁrm size. Here we use a
sample where the ﬁrm size restriction is at least two white-collar workers
instead of twenty-ﬁve white-collar workers. In line with the previous liter-
ature, we ﬁnd that wages increase with ﬁrm size. Note that the wage diﬀer-
ences between diﬀerent ﬁrm size classes are roughly unchanged over time.
To picture the wage dispersion, we use the coeﬃcient of variation be-
tween and within ﬁrms.22 Figure 9.15 shows that wage dispersion within
ﬁrms tends to increase with ﬁrm size, while wage dispersion between ﬁrms
tends to decrease with ﬁrm size.23
9.5.3 Wage Dynamics
Figure 9.16 presents the average log wage changes for private-sector,
white-collar workers. We notice that wage growth diﬀers strongly over the
business cycle for this group of workers. Wage growth is much higher for
the two peak periods of 1985 to 1986 and 1996 to 1997 than at the two low-
point years. From 1980 to 1981, there is even a decline in real average
wages. This procyclical pattern is strong and characterizes all segments of
the wage change distribution.
When comparing the group of workers moving between ﬁrms to all
workers (presented in ﬁgure 9.16), the results indicate that most moves are
voluntary, as movers have a much higher wage increase than the overall av-
erage for almost the whole period. Table 9A.3 in the appendix reports the
wage changes for diﬀerent parts of the distribution, and we see that the
340 Arngrim Hunnes, Jarle Møen, and Kjell G. Salvanes
22. We have no controls, that is, we look at the raw wage data.
23. Davis and Haltiwanger (1996, 364) write: “The negative relationship of establishment
size to wage dispersion [. . .] entirely reﬂects the behavior of the between-plant component of
wage dispersion. [. . .] In contrast, the within-plant coeﬃcient of wage variation tends to rise
with establishment size.”Fig. 9.14 Mean of ﬁrm mean log monthly wage by ﬁrm size: White-collar workers
in the private sector
Note: Graphs by year.
Fig. 9.15 Coeﬃcient of variation within and between ﬁrms: White-collar workers
in the private sector
Note: Graphs by year.same pattern is especially strong for the 75th percentile. Again the cyclical
patterns are strong, pointing to voluntary moves.
Figure 9.17 presents the wage increases for short- and long-tenured
workers. As we would expect, workers with short tenure have much higher
wage increases than workers who have stayed with the ﬁrm for a while.
Again the cyclical pattern is strong.
Turning to the sample of both blue- and white-collar workers presented
in table 9A.4 in the appendix, a procyclical pattern is present but much less
pronounced. This indicates that white-collar workers are under a more
ﬂexible regime in terms of wage setting, whether it has to do with ﬁrm-level
negotiations or other factors. Results for movers and diﬀerences between
short- and long-tenured workers hold also for this group of workers.
9.5.4 Worker Mobility within and across Firms
In this section, we present patterns of worker mobility across ﬁrms, that
is, ﬁrings and separations, as well the worker mobility rates within ﬁrms,
for example, promotions. We want to assess the distribution of worker exit
and entry rates both across groups of workers and ﬁrms and over the busi-
ness cycle. A novel feature is that we can calculate internal turnover rates
and entry rates for diﬀerent occupations within the ﬁrms. We will focus on
the results for white-collar workers in the manufacturing sector and private
services.
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Fig. 9.16 Average change in log monthly wage for all white-collar workers and for
white-collar workers who switch ﬁrms in the private sectorWorker Exit and Entry Rates
We start by presenting in ﬁgure 9.18 the development and size distribu-
tion for all ﬁrms deﬁned as 25 or more workers both in t and t – 1 in the
white-collar data set as well as for large ﬁrms deﬁned as 100 or more work-
ers, to make the results comparable across countries. Note that none of
these groups will be representative for the Norwegian economy, as ﬁrms
with 25 or more white-collar workers are relatively large in Norway. How-
ever, from ﬁgure 9.19, we see that the size distribution for all ﬁrms is very
stable. For “all ﬁrms,” that is, 25 or more white collar workers, average ﬁrm
size increased from 121 employees in 1981 to 139 in 1997. For ﬁrms with 100
or more white collar workers, size increased from 287 to 345 employees.
In order to illustrate the patterns of worker mobility, we present in ﬁg-
ures 9.20, 9.21, and 9.22 exit and entry rates by year, ﬁrm size, and for lower
and upper segments of the wage distribution. Tables 9A.5, 9A.6, and 9A.7
in the appendix provide more detailed information.24 The exit rate or
worker separation rate for all white-collar workers taken together is about
15 percent annually for all ﬁrms in our sample, and about 10 percent for
large ﬁrms. Salvanes and Førre (2003), using a data set without a lower
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24. Table 9A.8 in the appendix provides numbers for both white- and blue-collar workers
in the machinery and equipment industry (Sector 38). Table 9A.14 provides numbers for
white-collar workers by plant instead of ﬁrm.
Fig. 9.17 Average change in log monthly wage for all white-collar workers in the
private sector, by tenurelimit on ﬁrm size, ﬁnd an exit rate around 25 percent. This is only slightly
below results for the U.S. economy. The entry or hiring rate is between 14
percent and 19 percent for all ﬁrms and between 9 percent and 12 percent
for large ﬁrms. One observation, therefore, is that the turnover rates are
high for white-collar workers and that they decrease with ﬁrm size as
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Fig. 9.18 Number of white-collar workers and employment growth for ﬁrms in the
private sector, by ﬁrm size
Note: Large ﬁrms deﬁned as at least 100 white collar workers.Fig. 9.19 Kernel density log ﬁrm size: White-collar data
Fig. 9.20 Firm-level exit and entry rates: White-collar workers in the 
private sector
Notes: Large ﬁrms deﬁned as at least 100 white-collar workers. Graphs by all/large ﬁrms.expected. These ﬁndings are in line with previous work using other data
sets and diﬀerent parts of the ﬁrm size distribution (Salvanes and Førre
2003). Looking at diﬀerent segments of the workforce, see ﬁgures 9.21 and
9.22, we notice that white-collar workers in low-paid jobs have much
higher exit and entry rates than workers in high-paid jobs.25Thus, low-paid
jobs are more volatile than high-paid jobs. Figure 9.23 shows the kernel
densities for exit and entry rates at the ﬁrm level. The cyclical pattern is
quite interesting for worker ﬂows. The exit rate is quite stable over the cycle,
whereas the job destruction rate that comprises one part of the exit rate is
for many countries found to be countercyclical (for the United States, see
Davis and Haltiwanger [1992]; for Norway, see Salvanes [1997]). This pat-
tern appears to be true for all segments of the ﬁrms. It is the entry rate that
varies over the cycle in a procyclical fashion. Looking at job creation rate
only, a part of the entry rate, the standard result is that it is stable over the
cycle. This pattern also appears to be true for all segments of the workforce,
but it seems to be more pronounced for the lower-level jobs.
In table 9A.5 in the appendix, we see that entry rates are positively cor-
related with wage growth, suggesting that growing ﬁrms raise wages to at-
tract new workers. Somewhat surprisingly, the relationship between wage
growth and the worker exit rates is much weaker. One would expect wage
growth to be negatively correlated with the exit rate, and to some extent this
is so for low-level jobs. For workers in high-level jobs, however, table 9A.6
shows that there is signiﬁcant, positive correlation between wage growth
and exit rates. One explanation could be that managers in successful ﬁrms
get attractive outside oﬀers. Within-ﬁrm wage dispersion does not seem re-
lated to exit rates, nor to entry rates with one exception. For high-level jobs,
there is signiﬁcant positive correlation between wage dispersion and entry.
Internal Worker Dynamics
Because we have information on the internal structure of the ﬁrms’ la-
bor market, we can assess the internal worker turnover rates. Two measures
will be presented: internal turnover rates across occupations and the share
hired from within the ﬁrm.26 We look at twenty-two diﬀerent occupations;
compare with section 9.4.1. The number of occupations represented in
each ﬁrm has been stable over the period. The average is thirteen for all
ﬁrms and sixteen for large ﬁrms. The number of hierarchical levels has also
346 Arngrim Hunnes, Jarle Møen, and Kjell G. Salvanes
25. Low and high pay is here deﬁned as being in the bottom or top quartile of the within-
ﬁrm wage distribution, respectively. Very similar results can be found in tables 9A.6 and 9A.7
in the appendix, looking at high- and low-level jobs rather than high- and low-paid workers.
High- and low-level jobs are deﬁned as follows: ﬁrst, we calculate median wages for all jobs;
then we rank all jobs by their median wage. High-level jobs are those jobs whose median wage
is in the top 20 percent of the wage distribution, and low-level jobs are those in the bottom 20
percent.
26. See Hunnes, Møen, and Salvanes (2003) for more details on this.Fig. 9.21 Firm-level exit rates: White-collar workers in the private sector, split by
top/bottom quartile of the within-ﬁrm wage distribution
Notes: Large ﬁrms deﬁned as at least 100 white-collar workers. Graphs by all/large ﬁrms.
Fig. 9.22 Firm-level entry rates: White-collar workers in the private sector, split
by top/bottom quartile of the within-ﬁrm wage distribution
Notes: Large ﬁrms deﬁned as at least 100 white-collar workers. Graphs by all/large ﬁrms.been stable over time. The average is six for all ﬁrms and 6.8 for the 100 or
more ﬁrms. The number of levels appears to be larger for Norwegian ﬁrms
than the ﬁgure Oyer (chapter 12 in this volume) reports for Swedish ﬁrms.
Figure 9.24 shows that about 10 percent of the workers switch jobs in-
ternally. The number of new jobs ﬁlled internally is about 40 percent for all
white-collar workers. The numbers are similar across diﬀerent ﬁrm sizes.
Tables 9A.5, 9A.6, and 9A.7 in the appendix present further details. The
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Fig. 9.23 Kernel densities for ﬁrm-level exit and entry rates: White-collar workers
in the private sectornumber of internally ﬁlled jobs is much lower at the lower end of the job-
level distribution. We would expect that those jobs are ﬁlled externally, as
the ports of entry jobs are at the bottom. In table 9A.8 in the appendix, we
report results for blue- and white-collar workers together in the machinery
and equipment industry. Blue-collar workers comprise the bulk of the jobs
because the data are from the manufacturing sector. The external turnover
rates are much the same as for white-collar workers. The internal rates are
quite diﬀerent, being also half the rate of white-collar workers. The per-
centages of jobs ﬁlled internally are also much lower. Blue-collar jobs are
primarily ﬁlled externally.
9.6 Concluding Remarks
To what extent do diﬀerent ﬁrms follow diﬀerent wage policies? Do such
diﬀerences relate to how workers move between ﬁrms? What are the eﬀects
of diﬀerent wage bargaining regimes? The aim of this chapter has been
threefold: ﬁrst, to describe the Norwegian wage setting and employment
protection institutions; next, to describe data sets available for empirical
analysis; and, ﬁnally, to document stylized facts about the wage structure
and the worker mobility patterns in Norway. We analyze within- and be-
tween-ﬁrm wage diﬀerences and worker entry and exit rates in the period
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Fig. 9.24 Percentage of employees who switch jobs internally and percentage of
jobs ﬁlled internally: White-collar workers in the private sector
Notes: Large ﬁrms deﬁned as at least 100 white-collar workers. Graphs by all/large ﬁrms.1980 to 1997. Norway is an interesting case to study for several reasons.
The Norwegian economy is very open, but wage dispersion in Norway has
remained low, while most OECD countries have experienced a strong in-
crease. Also, certain labor market institutions are diﬀerent from other Eu-
ropean countries. Most notably, centralized wage bargaining is quite im-
portant. Diﬀerences in wage bargaining institutions between white- and
blue-collar workers within Norway provide an additional dimension for
comparison.
Norway is a high-wage country. Average monthly white-collar wage in
the early 1990s was about NOK 20,000, the equivalent of 2,500 EURO. Av-
erage monthly wage across both blue- and white-collar workers in the ma-
chinery and equipment industry was about NOK 17,000. Real white-collar
wages grew 18 percent over the sixteen-year period 1981 to 1997. Wage dis-
persion was low and stable with a coeﬃcient of variation for white-collar
workers of 31.8 percent in 1981 and 32.4 percent in 1997; that is, the stan-
dard deviation of white-collar wages was less than a third of the wage level.
Country studies from Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Denmark ﬁnd
coeﬃcients of variation in wages in the interval 33 to 41 percent. We ﬁnd
that wage dispersion among blue-collar workers is much smaller than wage
dispersion among white-collar workers. This is to be expected, as blue-
collar workers are a much more homogeneous group.
An important question we have analyzed is to what extent ﬁrms diﬀer in
their wage setting. Numerous economic models portray all ﬁrms as similar,
using the “representative ﬁrm” metaphor. How far from the truth is this
simpliﬁcation? We ﬁnd that most of the wage variation in Norway is within
ﬁrms. The average standard deviation of wages within ﬁrms is 79 percent
of the overall standard deviation. Still, ﬁrms vary considerably in their av-
erage wage level. The standard deviation of average ﬁrm wages is about 13
percent of the overall average wage, and between-ﬁrm wage variation rep-
resents 17 to 23 percent of the overall wage variation. The between share
has increased over time, suggesting that ﬁrms are becoming somewhat
more dissimilar. This development is related to changes in the workforce
composition and disappears when observable worker characteristics are
controlled for.
The correlation between the ﬁrm’s average wage and the standard devi-
ation of wages within the ﬁrm is positive and signiﬁcant, both when we
look at the wage level and the log of wages. Hence, high-wage ﬁrms have
larger within-ﬁrm wage dispersion than low-wage ﬁrms. Whether this is be-
cause high-wage ﬁrms are more heterogeneous with respect to the compo-
sition of the workforce or because high-wage ﬁrms follow a diﬀerent wage
policy is an interesting and important question that we will pursue in fu-
ture work.
Firms may diﬀer not only with respect to average wage and wage dis-
350 Arngrim Hunnes, Jarle Møen, and Kjell G. Salvanespersion, but also with respect to average wage growth. Looking into this,
we ﬁnd some heterogeneity. The interquartile range in average wage growth
across ﬁrms is 3 to 4 percentage points in the 1980s, and about 2 percent-
age points in the 1990s. These numbers are for white-collar workers. Wage
growth is strongly procyclical. When looking at the sample of both blue-
and white-collar workers in the machinery and equipment industry, how-
ever, the procyclical pattern is less pronounced. This might be related to
centralized wage bargaining being more important for blue-collar workers.
Workers who change ﬁrms have above average wages growth in all years.
This ﬁnding suggests that there are more voluntary moves than layoﬀs,
even during economic downturns.
In our sample, dominated by relatively large ﬁrms, about 15 percent of
the workers leave their employer each year. This is a fairly low number
compared to other countries. A previous study for Norway, using the en-
tire universe of ﬁrms, have found the exit rate to be about 25 percent. We
ﬁnd that the exit rate is very stable over the business cycle. This may seem
surprising, but it is in line with previous studies suggesting that higher 
job destruction rates in bad years are counteracted by less voluntary job
changes. The entry rate, on the other hand, is highly procyclical, and varies
between 14 to 19 percent. Previous studies suggest that this is driven by
more voluntary job changes is good years, while the job creation rates are
fairly stable over the cycle. Entry and exit rates are much higher for work-
ers in low-level jobs than for workers in high-level jobs. Hence, low-level
jobs have, on average, a shorter duration.
There is substantial heterogeneity in entry and exit rates across ﬁrms.
Some of this heterogeneity is explained by ﬁrm characteristics. First, we
ﬁnd that entry and exit rates are smaller in large ﬁrms than in small ﬁrms.
Obviously, large internal labor markets oﬀer better career opportunities
within ﬁrms. Second, entry rates are positively correlated with wage
growth, suggesting that growing ﬁrms raise wages to attract new workers.
Somewhat surprisingly, the relationship between wage growth and the
worker exit rates is much weaker. One would expect wage growth to be neg-
atively correlated with the exit rate, and to some extent this is so for low-
level jobs. For workers in high-level jobs, however, there is signiﬁcant, pos-
itive correlation between wage growth and the exit rate. One explanation
could be that managers in successful ﬁrms get attractive outside oﬀers.
Having information about the internal structure of ﬁrms’ labor markets,
we are not restricted to analyzing worker mobility across ﬁrms. Looking at
within-ﬁrm job mobility, we ﬁnd that about 10 percent of white-collar
workers change occupation each year. Occupations are broadly deﬁned in
our data; hence, these workers should experience a signiﬁcant shift in their
job content. The share of workers changing occupation internally is simi-
lar for small and large ﬁrms, and the number is also stable over the business
Wage Structure and Labor Mobility in Norway, 1980–97 351cycle. The share of new white-collar jobs ﬁlled internally varies between 35
and 46 percent. There is more external hiring in good years. Consistent
with the hypothesis that low-level jobs are “ports of entry” into the ﬁrms,
we ﬁnd that the share of jobs ﬁlled internally is much lower for low-level
jobs than for high-level jobs. The diﬀerence is particularly large in large
ﬁrms. Among blue-collar workers, the share of workers who change occu-
pation within ﬁrms is much lower than for white-collar workers. The share
of new jobs ﬁlled internally is also much lower.
Future work on the Norwegian data should go deeper into the impor-
tance of sorting and clarify further to what extent diﬀerent wage structures
reﬂect diﬀerences in the workforce composition and to what extent they re-
ﬂect managerial choices. How has sorting of workers developed over time
and what are possible driving forces? How do diﬀerent managerial choices
with respect to wage policy aﬀect ﬁrm productivity? A related issue is the
eﬀect of technological change and innovativeness on the wage structure.
Finally, there is more work to be done on the eﬀect of diﬀerent wage bar-
gaining regimes, exploiting diﬀerences between blue- and white-collar
workers, diﬀerent sectors, and diﬀerent time periods.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7Table 9A.2 Structure of wages within and between ﬁrms (all workers in the machinery and
equipment industry; sector 38)
Monthly wage Log monthly wage
1987 1993 1997 1987 1993 1997
Average wage 16,328 16,989 18,311 9.673 9.710 9.779
SD 4,241 4,586 5,374 0.227 0.236 0.261
90th percentile 21,487 22,805 25,364 9.975 10.035 10.141
10th percentile 12,664 12,938 13,873 9.447 9.468 9.538
No. of workers 24,268 26,805 25,446 24,268 26,805 25,446
Average of ﬁrm average wage 15,436 15,930 16,877 9.620 9.649 9.703
SD 1,621 1,807 2,010 0.097 0.104 0.109
90th percentile 17,625 18,629 19,383 9.755 9.814 9.847
10th percentile 13,583 14,123 14,787 9.508 9.544 9.585
No. of ﬁrms 119 149 139 119 149 139
Average of SD of wage 3,278 3,549 4,026 0.185 0.191 0.212
SD 1,027 1,142 1,219 0.044 0.047 0.044
90th percentile 4,734 4,910 5,464 0.251 0.259 0.274
10th percentile 2,057 2,201 2,487 0.131 0.136 0.153
No. of ﬁrms 119 149 139 119 149 139
Average CV of wages 0.210 0.220 0.236 0.019 0.020 0.022
SD 0.052 0.056 0.054 0.005 0.005 0.004
90th percentile 0.278 0.297 0.309 0.026 0.026 0.028
10th percentile 0.141 0.149 0.169 0.014 0.014 0.016
No. of ﬁrms 119 149 139 119 149 139
Correlation (average wage, 
SD wage) 0.718 0.690 0.762 0.501 0.489 0.447
Signiﬁcance level 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Average wage for workers 
between 25 and 30 15,642 15,650 16,571 9.642 9.643 9.701
SD 2,935 2,836 2,999 0.175 0.171 0.165
90th percentile 19,744 19,658 20,284 9.891 9.886 9.918
10th percentile 12,689 12,671 13,606 9.448 9.447 9.518
No. of workers 3,299 4,654 3,781 3,299 4,654 3,781
Average wage for workers 
between 45 and 50 17,211 17,888 19,338 9.723 9.755 9.831
SD 4,678 5,341 5,959 0.236 0.259 0.268
90th percentile 23,035 24,954 27,825 10.045 10.125 10.234
10th percentile 13,151 13,200 14,155 9.484 9.488 9.558
No. of workers 3,102 4,474 3,988 3,102 4,474 3,988





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 9A.4 Wage dynamics for all workers in the machinery and equipment industry (sector 38)
  monthly wage   log monthly wage
1987 1993 1997 1987 1993 1997
Average change in wage 341 308 473 0.027 0.017 0.024
SD 1,423 1,269 1,513 0.084 0.072 0.080
90th percentile 1,686 1,402 1,822 0.112 0.083 0.097
10th percentile –1,180 –489 –506 –0.060 –0.027 –0.027
No. of workers 20,401 22,957 19,489 20,401 22,957 19,489
Average of ﬁrm average 
change in wage 444 175 396 0.034 0.011 0.022
SD 488 364 473 0.031 0.023 0.026
90th percentile 1,054 579 884 0.077 0.035 0.049
10th percentile –121 –178 –98 –0.004 –0.013 –0.010
No. of ﬁrms 119 149 139 119 149 139
Average of SD of change
in wage 1,127 820 1,146 0.072 0.049 0.065
SD 696 656 610 0.034 0.033 0.031
90th percentile 1,678 1,417 1,956 0.102 0.078 0.097
10th percentile 598 260 473 0.040 0.016 0.031
No. of ﬁrms 119 149 139 119 149 139
Average change in wage for 
workers who change ﬁrms 297 346 597 0.025 0.016 0.023
SD 1,684 2,222 2,406 0.103 0.114 0.140
90th percentile 2,205 2,679 3,362 0.142 0.157 0.159
10th percentile –1,355 –1,169 –1,998 –0.084 –0.070 –0.119
No. of workers 609 319 697 609 319 697
Average change in wage for 
workers with tenure  3 617 612 736 0.050 0.039 0.041
SD 1,558 1,573 1,955 0.106 0.095 0.106
90th percentile 2,398 2,234 2,403 0.181 0.141 0.141
10th percentile –1,073 –505 –545 –0.059 –0.025 –0.031
No. of workers 4,488 3,272 3,289 4,488 3,272 3,289
Average change in wage for 
workers with tenure  3 264 257 420 0.021 0.014 0.020
SD 1,373 1,203 1,401 0.075 0.067 0.073
90th percentile 1,492 1,221 1,665 0.099 0.072 0.085
10th percentile –1,220 –487 –492 –0.060 –0.027 –0.025
No. of workers 15,913 19,685 16,200 15,913 19,685 16,200






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 9A.8 Mobility: all workers in the machinery and equipment industry (all jobs; sector 38)
All ﬁrms Firms with 100  employees
1987 1993 1997 1987 1993 1997
No. of ﬁrms 119 149 139 55 60 65
Employees 204 180 183 379 370 330
SD 290 265 242 353 338 290
No. of occupations 11 12 12 15 16 15
SD 4 4 4 2 3 3
No. of levels 6 6 6 7 7 7
SD 1 1 1 1 1 1
Employment growth –0.08 –0.04 0.11 –0.09 0.05 0.21
SD 0.24 0.33 0.35 0.21 0.42 0.45
Exit rate (workers) 0.32 0.21 0.18 0.28 0.16 0.14
Exit rate 0.29 0.20 0.19 0.29 0.19 0.19
SD 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.09
Exit rate, top quartile 0.27 0.12 0.13 0.27 0.13 0.13
SD 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.20 0.14 0.08
Exit rate, bottom quartile 0.35 0.27 0.26 0.35 0.25 0.27
SD 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.15
Entry rate 0.18 0.14 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.28
SD 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.16
Entry rate, top quartile 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.16
SD 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12
Entry rate, bottom quartile 0.30 0.21 0.39 0.29 0.25 0.43
SD 0.20 0.18 0.22 0.15 0.19 0.21
Percentage of employees who 
switch jobs internally 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
SD 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
Percentage of new jobs ﬁlled internally 0.23 0.29 0.18 0.23 0.30 0.19
SD 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.16
Percentage of workers who have 
been at ﬁrm 5  years 0.54 0.74 0.63 0.56 0.69 0.61
SD 0.27 0.19 0.18 0.27 0.19 0.20
Correlation (exit rate, average wage) 0.009 0.031 –0.152 –0.190 –0.123 –0.320
Signiﬁcance level 0.923 0.706 0.073 0.166 0.350 0.009
Correlation (exit rate, average 
wage change) –0.041 0.101 –0.095 –0.068 –0.213 –0.168
Signiﬁcance level 0.655 0.223 0.264 0.621 0.102 0.182
Correlation (exit rate, SD wage) 0.021 0.054 –0.134 –0.155 –0.216 –0.255
Signiﬁcance level 0.825 0.514 0.117 0.257 0.098 0.040
Correlation (entry rate, average 
wage) –0.097 –0.051 –0.119 –0.155 –0.326 –0.270
Signiﬁcance level 0.294 0.537 0.164 0.259 0.011 0.030
Correlation (entry rate, average 
wage change) 0.161 0.128 0.221 0.133 0.115 0.103
Signiﬁcance level 0.081 0.119 0.009 0.333 0.381 0.414
Correlation (entry rate, SD wage) –0.163 0.019 –0.038 –0.227 –0.282 –0.112
Signiﬁcance level 0.076 0.815 0.655 0.096 0.029 0.374




















Table 9A.10 Decomposition of log monthly wage (all workers in the machinery and
equipment industry; sector 38).
All workers White collar Blue collar
Year Total Between Total Between Total Between
1987 0.0517 0.0089 0.0657 0.0049 0.0238 0.0115
1988 0.0541 0.0078 0.0689 0.0049 0.0179 0.0092
1989 0.0500 0.0084 0.0630 0.0040 0.0190 0.0099
1990 0.0451 0.0078 0.0625 0.0043 0.0166 0.0087
1991 0.0528 0.0094 0.0660 0.0043 0.0191 0.0111
1992 0.0525 0.0097 0.0664 0.0048 0.0195 0.0113
1993 0.0558 0.0120 0.0648 0.0062 0.0247 0.0160
1994 0.0549 0.0114 0.0654 0.0060 0.0187 0.0113
1995 0.0582 0.0124 0.0679 0.0063 0.0207 0.0115
1996 0.0582 0.0137 0.0668 0.0059 0.0225 0.0115
1997 0.0680 0.0158 0.0693 0.0065 0.0291 0.0114Table 9A.11 The ratio between the between variation and the total variation (white-
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